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Throughout most of the 19
th and 20
th centuries, the number of people in the 
world in absolute poverty (defined as living on less than the equivalent of one US 
dollar per day in 1985 PPP terms) had been increasing almost continually 
(Bouguignon and Morrisson 2002). Since the late 1970s, however, the number has 
declined by more than 200 million, or from 15 to 7 per cent of the global population; 
and the number on less than $2 per day has declined by 450 million, or from 40 to 19 
per cent of the world’s people, according to new estimates by Sala-i-Martin (2002).  
Remarkable though that recent achievement has been in such a short period, 
Sala-i-Martin’s data suggest there are still 350 million on less than $1 and almost one 
billion on less than $2 per day – half of whom are in Asia. World Bank estimates 
(e.g., Chen and Ravallion 2001) suggest those numbers are several times larger, with 
possibly as many as 1.2 billion on less than $1 per day. 
The evidence presented by Sala-i-Martin (2002) suggests economic growth 
differences have been largely responsible for the differences in poverty alleviation 
across regions, a finding supported by numerous other studies (e.g., Dollar and Kraay 
2002). Initiatives that boost economic growth are therefore likely to be helpful in the 
fight against poverty.  
Trade liberalization is one such initiative that tends to boost economic 
growth.
1 But it also alters relative prices, so its net effect on poverty reduction 
depends also on the signs of those relative product and factor price changes. If the 
price changes are pro-poor, then they will reinforce any positive growth effects of 
trade reform on the poor. This paper explores the poverty implications of three current 
                                                 
1 The link between openness and economic growth, while not completely unambiguous and universal, 
is strong, and there is no evidence that openness is harmful to growth (see the discussion in McCulloch, 
Winters and Cirera 2001, Ch. 2). Trade’s impact on growth can be much reduced in the absence of 
liberal domestic markets, macro stability, and appropriate institutions and infrastructure, however, 
since those are all necessary to enable producers to respond to changes in international market signals 
(Hoekman et al. 2002). For a comprehensive survey of the links between trade, growth and poverty, see 
Berg and Krueger (2002). A survey of the empirical evidence is available in Winters, McCulloch and 
McKay (2002).  2
trade reform agendas with a particular focus on the role of reducing agricultural 
import barriers. 
At the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
Doha in November 2001, members agreed to launch the next comprehensive round of 
multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs). Even though there is a substantial focus on 
development concerns in the Doha Ministerial Declaration (WTO 2001b), numerous 
developing countries remain sceptical that they will receive sufficient gains from that 
MTN to warrant the inevitable costs of negotiations and adjustments. They and some 
in the donor community also still need to be convinced that such trade reform will 
alleviate rather than add to poverty and food insecurity in developing countries. The 
net food-importing countries are especially worried that they will be made worse off 
by agricultural trade reform.   
In offering an economic assessment first of the opportunities and challenges 
provided by the Doha MTN round for developing countries seeking to trade their way 
out of poverty, the present paper begins by reporting some modelling results. Those 
results suggest that agricultural trade policies remain the most costly of all goods 
market distortions in world trade. What becomes clear is that if developing countries 
want to benefit from the Doha round, they need to free up their own markets so their 
producers are better able to take advantage of new market-opening opportunities 
abroad. The paper addresses such questions as whether food-importing countries 
would suffer from higher food prices in international markets, and the impact on food 
security and poverty alleviation.  
Attention then turns to the non-binding agreement among APEC countries to 
free up their trade by 2020. Modelling results underline the point that gains from that 
regional initiative will be minor unless agriculture is included.  
And the third reform agenda examined relates to China’s accession to WTO. 
That is altering relative prices in China to a much larger extent than the Doha Round 
is likely to do, and the conventional wisdom is that it will do so in ways that will 
exacerbate poverty in that country. The results presented offer a somewhat more 
optimistic view.  
The paper concludes with lessons of relevance for the domestic and trade 




Where are the biggest potential gains from the next WTO round? 
  
Tariffs facing poor-country exports to other markets are high. A recent book 
pointed out that Mongolians and Norwegians both paid the US about $23 million in 
tariffs in 2001. But Mongolia exported $143 million while Norway exported $5.2 
billion worth of products, or 40 times as much. In effect, Mongolians paid 16 cents in 
tariffs to sell a dollar's worth of sweaters, while the Norwegians paid half a cent for 
every dollar's worth of gourmet smoke salmon, jet engine parts and North Sea crude 
they exported. Clearly, trade barriers of one country can have very different impacts 
on other countries’ economies. 
At the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the tariff equivalent of import 
market access barriers to goods trade were low for minerals and energy raw materials 
and for most manufactures entering developed country markets (the exceptions being 
textiles and clothing); but they were high for numerous manufactures entering 
developing country markets and even higher for agricultural goods entering both rich 
and poor countries (Table 1). Since developing countries’ interests in market access 
opportunities abroad are primarily in either farm products and/or light manufactures 
such as textiles and clothing – goods that are the most protected in world trade (see 
also WTO 2001a) – they have a great deal to gain potentially from the Doha Round. 
That fact is reflected in a recent set of empirical estimates using a model of the 
global economy known as GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project), which is an applied 
general equilibrium model based in Purdue University (Hertel 1997).
2 According to 
estimates in Anderson (2003), of all the economic gains to be had in 2005 from 
removing the barriers to trade in goods that will still be in place after all Uruguay 
Round commitments are implemented, almost half (48 per cent) would come from 
agricultural and processed food policy reform in OECD countries (Table 2) – even 
though such products in those countries contribute only 4 per cent of global GDP and 
less than one-tenth of world trade. Another one-sixth of the welfare gains would come 
from reform of farm and food policies of developing countries.  
Textiles and clothing reforms would be the next biggest contributor, although 
they appear pale by comparison with agricultural reform: their potential global 
welfare contribution is only one-ninth that of agriculture’s (7 per cent compared with 
65 per cent). This big difference reflects two facts: one is that projected distortions to 
                                                 
2 The GTAP model is a standard, multi-region model that is currently in use by several hundred 
researchers in scores of countries on five continents. The Version 4 data base builds on contributions from 
many of these individuals, as well as the national and international agencies in the GTAP Consortium.  4
prices for agriculture are more than twice those for textiles and clothing in 2005; the 
other is that textiles and clothing contribute only 1.5 per cent to the value of world 
production and 5 per cent to the value of world trade, half or less the shares for farm 
products (Anderson 2002). 
However, two assumptions are crucial in generating the results reported in 
Table 2. One is that China and Taiwan, having joined the WTO at the end of 
2001/start of 2002, does in fact enjoy the same accelerated access to OECD markets 
under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) as other 
developing countries that were already WTO members. The other crucial assumption 
is that OECD countries fully implement the spirit of the ATC by the end of 2004, that 
is, they remove remaining import quotas and do not replace them with similarly 
protective instruments such as safeguard measures. Dropping either of those 
assumptions reduces very substantially the estimated gains from Uruguay Round 
implementation (Anderson et al. 1997b), and therefore would raise the potential gains 
from textile and clothing reform in the next and subsequent WTO rounds than is 
reflected in Table 2.  
The distribution of the gains across regions that would result from full trade 
liberalization is clear from the upper half of Table 2. As always, most of the gains 
accrue to the liberalizing region. For example, all but one-tenth (12/122) of the gains 
from high-income countries removing distortions to their trade in farm and food 
products accrues to those countries. Even so, that farm trade reform contributes more 
than one-quarter of the total welfare gains to developing countries from developed 
countries liberalizing their merchandise trade (12/43). As for developing countries 
liberalizing their own farm and food policies, three-quarters of the benefits therefrom 
stay with the developing countries themselves (31/43), and those policies contribute 
almost half of the gains from those countries' overall merchandise trade reform 
(31/65). 
WTO members were right, therefore, to insist that agricultural reform must 
continue into the new century without a pause. In particular, developing countries as a 
group have a major stake in the process of farm policy reform continuing: according 
to the model results in Table 2, farm and food policies globally contribute 40 per cent 
(43/108) of the cost to developing economies of global goods trade distortions. 
Textile and clothing policies also harm them greatly, but barely one-third as much as  5
farm policies.
3 The Table shows that 60% of the contribution to developing countries 
from trade liberalization – and 72% of that from farm trade liberalization -- would 
come from reforms by developing countries themselves.
4  
The above GTAP modeling study found that full liberalization of OECD farm 
policies would boost the volume of global agricultural trade by more than 50 per cent, 
but would cause real international food prices to rise by only 5 per cent on average. 
For the subset of low-income countries that would remain net food-importing 
economies after such a reform and thereby suffer a deterioration in its terms of trade, 
the extent of the rise in their food import prices would be small.  
The results for developing countries in Table 2 are disaggregated in Table 3 to 
show the effects on subgroups of Asian and other countries. In dollar terms the gains 
from global liberalization would be equally as great for South Asia as for Southeast 
Asia, while less than half as large for the much smaller economic region of Sub-
Saharan Africa. All regions shown are net gainers: even though some of them suffer a 
terms of trade deterioration, that cost is more than offset by improved efficiency of 
domestic resource use following reform. Just over half (52%) of the global gains 
accrue to Asia. 
If these were not enough reasons for a developing country government to 
become an active participant in the Doha Round, including embracing trade reform at 
home, there are at least three other reasons for doing so. One is that the more each 
country is prepared to provide trading partners with greater access to its own market, 
the more those partners are willing to reciprocate by providing greater access to their 
markets. That benefits exporters in all countries, offsetting the loss of domestic 
political support from import-competing producers. The second reason is that once a 
country binds its reform commitments, as required under WTO, its government is 
better able to resist the temptation to give in to political pressure to reverse that 
reform. And the third reason has to do with the spread of globalization, which is 
raising the net political benefits of opening up markets versus remaining protectionist 
and interventionist. The dramatic falls in the costs of doing business across national 
boundaries mean not only that the rewards from opening one’s own economy to 
foreign trade and investment flows have risen, but also that the costs of not adopting 
                                                 
3 It should be recognised that these results ignore the effect of tariff preference erosion. In so 
far as a developing country receives such preferences at present in OECD markets, the above 
results slightly overstate the potential gains from their reforms. This point is taken up below. 
4 Martin (2001) points out that since the mid-1980s, the share of developing countries’ agricultural 
exports that are going to other developing countries has risen from less than 30 per cent to more than 
40 per cent.  6
and maintaining an open, stable and transparent set of economic policies also are 
rising. If, as a result of these globalization forces, the governments of developing 
economies choose to embrace more reform at home, it makes sense to capitalize on 
that decision by using the next WTO Round to demand greater access to trading 
partners’ markets in return. 
 
Qualifications to the global modeling results 
There are three other important source of gains from trade reform that are not 
captured in the above results, namely, gains from reform to trade in services, gains 
from increasing competition and economies of scale, and dynamic gains.  
The nature of service sector policies makes estimating their effects much more 
difficult than is the case for goods barriers to trade. Nonetheless, preliminary 
empirical attempts suggest restrictions on services trade and investment flows are 
very substantial, particularly by developing countries (Findlay and Warren 2000). 
Moreover, the GATS negotiations during the Uruguay Round resulted in almost no 
commitments to lowering those impediments (Hoekman 1996). During that Round 
many developing countries considered the negotiations that led to the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as something they had to put up with in 
order to get agriculture and textiles ‘concessions’. Yet the gains to developing 
countries from opening up their services markets, as for developed countries, would 
be enormous. Those gains would come not just directly to consumers but also to 
producers who purchase services as intermediate inputs into their goods production. 
Farmers in particular would benefit from services reform because they depend heavily 
on such things as transport services to get their produce to domestic and overseas 
markets (Anderson and Hoekman 2000).  
While measuring distortions to services trade and mark-ups by imperfectly 
competitive firms is fraught with difficulty, initial attempts are beginning to bear fruit. 
A new study by Francois (2001) includes one set of estimates of the tariff equivalent 
of those distortions in a version of the GTAP model that also incorporates imperfect 
competition and scale economies. Specifically, that study assumes monopolistic 
competition exists in the non-primary sectors involving economies of scale that are 
internal to each firm. These modifications amplify the estimated gains from trade 
considerably. For example, that study finds that if applied tariff rates for both goods 
and services were to be cut in half, the global gains would be US$385 billion, of 
which 51 per cent would be due to services reform. The 49 per cent due to halving  7
tariffs on goods trade ($192 billion) in the Francois study compares with the above 
estimate (where no imperfect competition is assumed) of around $250 billion from 
totally removing all tariffs on merchandise trade. The key point to draw from this 
comparison is that the gains from trade reported above should be interpreted as lower-
bound estimates for at least two reasons: because they apply only to goods trade, 
leaving aside the important distortions prevalent in services markets; and because they 
are based on the assumption that there are no economies of scale and that perfect 
competition prevails in all sectors. 
None of the studies reported above draw on a truly dynamic economic model. 
They measure well the effects of producers reallocating their resources and consumers 
adjusting their purchases when relative product prices change with trade reform, but 
they do not measure the impact of such reform on investment behaviour. Yet we 
know from experience that when markets are freed up, investors divert their funds 
towards expanding the now-more-profitable activities and away from the now-less-
profitable ones. They are also willing to invest more in aggregate, because of the 
reduced uncertainty associated with binding the reforms in WTO schedules. That 
boost to investment applies even more following the reductions in barriers to foreign 
investment and hence international technology transfers of the past two decades. Thus 
economic growth is boosted by that diversion and expansion of investment funds, 
over and above the boost in output from reallocating existing resource endowments. 
This additional effect is omitted from most empirical modelling efforts for two 
reasons: partly because it takes much longer for analysts to build and to run dynamic 
models than comparative static ones, and partly because the extent to which investors 
respond to changing incentives is less well understood and hence cannot be included 
with as much certainty as the other behavioural characteristics that are common to 
both comparative static and dynamic models. Keeping that in mind, it is nonetheless 
instructive to note the results of a recent study that examined the range of outcomes 
generated as the responsiveness of productivity to openness is varied. 
The World Bank (2001, Ch. 6) conducted a study very similar to the one 
reported above, and obtained very similar results when its version of the GTAP model 
was in comparative static mode (a global welfare gain from complete liberalization of 
merchandise trade of $312 billion per year by 2015, compared with the present 
study’s estimate of $254 billion as early as 2005 when the world economy would be 
somewhat smaller). When their same model was switched into dynamic mode, 
however, that global gain increased two- to three-fold over reasonable ranges of  8
productivity responsiveness parameters. This adds further weight to the claim that the 
earlier welfare results should be considered as very much lower-bound estimates of 
the gains from trade liberalization.  
  In short, developing countries have much to gain economically from taking 
part in the next round of WTO negotiations to liberalize trade, and more so the more 
they are willing to embrace reform at home so as to enable their firms to take greatest 
advantage of the opportunities provided by the opening up of markets abroad. And 
this applies especially to agricultural trade reform. 
 
Wouldn’t food-importing countries lose from higher international food prices? 
 
Developing countries in Asia, as elsewhere, are quite heterogeneous in their 
trade specialization patterns (Wilson 2002a). Among the net food-importing 
developing countries, some fear agricultural protection cuts by OECD countries will 
lead to higher international food prices for their imports. Yet even those developing 
countries need not lose out from farm support cuts abroad. If, for example, they are 
close to self-sufficient in food without price supports (as many net food importing 
developing countries are), and reform abroad raises the international price of food, 
they may switch to become sufficiently export-oriented that their net national 
economic welfare rises. A second possibility is that the developing country's own 
policies are sufficiently biased against food production that the country is a net 
importer, despite having a comparative advantage in food. In that case, it has been 
shown that the international price rise can improve national economic welfare, even if 
the price change is not sufficient to turn that distorted economy into a net food 
exporter (Anderson and Tyers 1993). That comes about because the higher price of 
food attracts mobile resources away from more-distorted sectors, thereby improving 
the efficiency of national resource allocation. Because of these two possibilities, the 
number of poor countries for whom a rise in international food prices might cause 
some hardship is much smaller than the number that are currently not net exporters of 
agricultural products.  
What about those developing countries whose comparative advantage is 
gradually moving from primary products to (initially unskilled) labour-intensive 
manufactures, as in much of Asia? While that industrialization lowers their direct 
interest in agricultural trade reform abroad, it heightens their keenness to see barriers 
to exports of textiles and clothing lowered. That interest of theirs in textile trade  9
expansion should be shared by agricultural-exporting developing countries, for if Asia 
could export more manufactures, it would tend to become a larger net importer of 
agricultural products. Conversely, lowered industrial-country barriers to agricultural 
trade would reduce the need for the more land-abundant developing countries to move 
into manufactures in competition with the newly industrializing ones. Scope clearly 
exists for the two groups to band together and negotiate as a single voice calling for 
barriers to both farm and textile trade to be lowered, so that each group can better 
exploit its comparative advantage to the direct benefit of the vast majority of poor 
people in both. If that means lowering protected domestic food prices, some farm 
labourers will find jobs in the expanding light industrial sector where wages will have 
risen. Even those staying in agriculture need not lose, if savings from cuts in price 
supports were used to reduce underinvestment in such areas as agricultural R&D and 
rural roads, education and health. 
 
Wouldn’t poverty and food insecurity increase in low-income countries because 
of higher international food prices? 
 
The impact of trade liberalization on income distribution and thereby on 
poverty is not always clear: even though the effects of trade policies on capital owners 
and workers have been studied by trade theorists for centuries, applying that theory to 
the real world turns out to be a complex empirical task (Winters 2000; McCulloch, 
Winters and Cirera 2001; Hoekman et al. 2002). This is because the economy-wide 
effects depend (a) on the shares of households’ income from different productive 
factors such as labour and land, whose prices will have changed (depending on the 
size of the changes in relative producer prices, factor substitutability, factor 
intensities, and factor mobility between sectors), (b) on their expenditure shares on 
different products (whose consumer prices also will have changed and not necessarily 
to the same extent as producer prices not least because of marketing margins), and on 
any changes in net transfers to them (e.g. increased handouts, decreased taxation, 
more remitances from urban relatives). Those complexities make it difficult to 
generalize a priori, or even in the face of empirical modelling studies when they 
report effects of reform just on production, trade, prices and aggregate economic 
welfare. Even so, some observations are nonetheless worth making about the effects 
on poverty and food security of reducing agricultural protectionism globally.  10
Most low-income countries have not propped up the producer price of food. In 
so far as an international food price rise is transmitted domestically, the vast majority 
of the poor would benefit directly. This is because they are in farm households and are 
net sellers of food. Even poor landless farm labourers who are net buyers of food 
would benefit indirectly from agricultural trade liberalization via a rise in the demand 
for their unskilled labour, assuming that raises their wage sufficient to more than 
offset the rise in food prices. Since the more affluent people in cities would find it 
relatively easy to pay a little extra for food, the only other major vulnerable group is 
the under-employed urban poor. But even they may not to be worse off because the 
trade reform would be likely to generate a more-than-offsetting increase in the 
demand for their (often informal sector) services. 
  What about the impact of reform on food price variability and other aspects of 
food security, especially as it affects the poorest households? Contrary to popular 
belief, trade liberalization is much more likely to reduce than raise food insecurity for 
the vast majority of the world’s poor. Food security means always having access to 
the minimum supply of basic food necessary for survival. The key to that, in addition 
to peace and greater efficiency in the functioning of staple food markets, is 
strengthened purchasing power of the poor. That is, enhancing food security is mainly 
about alleviating poverty. The rate of food self-sufficiency is at most only a 
supplementary indicator, and only while there remains a perception that food 
insecurity rises when the level of food self-sufficiency in basic foods falls much 
below 100 per cent. 
Eliminating all agricultural policy distortions in developed countries would 
raise international prices for agricultural products on average, and reduce their 
variance by ‘thickening’ the market, which would stimulate production in non-
protected countries. According to one recent study (Diao, Somwaru and Roe 2001), 
that would boost the value of agricultural exports of developing countries by 24 per 
cent while dampening their agricultural imports by just 2 per cent. That suggests food 
self-sufficiency in many low-income countries would rise. As well, since a high 
proportion of the poorest households in developing countries are producers and net 
sellers of food, they would benefit from such reform. In both respects, therefore, food 
security for the vast majority of households in low-income countries should be 
enhanced on average. Those same households would be helped even further if 
agricultural price-depressing policies were in place domestically and these are  11
removed. The latter reform also boosts self-sufficiency in agricultural products and 
thereby boosts even further perceived food security in those economies.  
The Diao, Somwaru and Roe (2001) study estimates that eliminating 
developing countries’ own agricultural price distortions would boost their farm export 
value by a further 6 per cent. True, the households that are net buyers of food in such 
economies will face higher food prices; but whether they become less food secure 
depends also on what has happens to their earnings (and/or transfers). If they are 
landless rural poor, their earning prospects will have risen along with the growth in 
demand for farm labour. As for urban households, the vast majority of them are more 
affluent than those in rural households and so can well afford to pay higher market 
prices for food. This suggests only a small proportion of households in low-income 
economies would be net food buyers at risk of becoming more food-insecure as a 
result of rising domestic food prices following trade liberalization.  
What about in low-income economies where agricultural trade liberalization 
means lower domestic prices for agricultural products because such countries that 
have kept domestic food prices above international levels via import restrictions? It is 
true that removing those distortions will reduce farm incomes in those countries 
(albeit by more for larger than smaller farms). Certainly urban households will benefit 
from lower food prices. However, food self-sufficiency will fall -- and it is the fall in 
both farm earnings and food self-sufficiency that focuses the attention of those who 
argue that agricultural trade liberalization is bad for poor households.  
Focusing on just the direct effects of agricultural trade policy reform can be 
misleading, however, not least because it does not take account of the fact that such 
reform is typically done in the context of multilateral, economy-wide liberalization. 
Being multilateral means that other countries’ farm protection cuts raise international 
food prices and so less of a price fall occurs than when a country cuts it agricultural 
protection unilaterally. And being economy-wide means the decline in demand for 
farm labour is more or less than offset by a growth in demand for labour in expanding 
non-farm industries.  
In short, at least two points are worth stressing. First, eliminating agricultural 
policy distortions in developed countries would increase the mean and decrease the 
variance of international prices for agricultural products, which would stimulate 
production in other countries. That suggests food self-sufficiency would rise in those 
low-income countries that transmit international prices to their domestic market. 
Second, since a high proportion of the poorest households in low-income countries  12
are producers and net sellers of food, they would be key beneficiaries of such reform. 
In both respects, therefore, food security for the vast majority of households in low-
income countries should be enhanced on average. Those same households would be 
helped even further if they had been subject to price-depressing domestic policies and 
these were removed. The latter reform also boosts self-sufficiency in agricultural 
products and thereby boosts perceived food security even further in those economies. 
The households that are net buyers of food in such economies would face higher food 
prices, but whether they become less food secure depends also on what happens to 
their earnings (and/or transfers). If they are landless rural poor, their earning prospects 
will have risen along with the growth in demand for farm labour. As for urban 
households, the vast majority of them are more affluent than those in rural households 
and so can well afford to pay higher market prices for food. This suggests only a 
small proportion of households in low-income economies would be net food buyers at 
risk of becoming more food-insecure as a result of rising domestic food prices 
following trade liberalization.  
 
What about APEC regional trade liberalization? 
 
Further MFN trade liberalization by APEC members, as promised in the 
declaration following the APEC Leaders’ Summit in Bogor in November 1994 and 
confirmed in subsequent summits, continues to be in prospect. A study that examined 
that scenario empirically found that the welfare results depend even more heavily than 
the above studies on whether agriculture is included in the reform (as demanded by the 
APEC food-exporting countries but contrary to what APEC’s Northeast Asian members 
want). Specifically, the welfare gains from this regional liberalization are 65 per cent 
greater when all goods markets are liberalized relative to the welfare gains when 
agriculture is excluded. (Services trade liberalization again is ignored, for want of 
reliable estimates of services protection rates.) Provided agriculture is included, this 
further reform by APEC economies would add one-third to the global welfare gains 
from the reforms under the Uruguay Round (Anderson et al. 1997b). It was therefore 
heartening to see that APEC leaders, at their meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico on 26-27 
October 2002, agreed that one of the objectives of the Doha Round should be the 
abolition (not just the reduction) of all forms of subsidies on farm exports. 
 
What about China’s accession to WTO?  13
 
  Because China’s accession to WTO involves a decline in the domestic price of 
some farm products, and because farm households in China are among the country’s 
poorest, that trade reform is often pointed to as an example of one that will exacerbate 
poverty. To explore that possibility, a set of empirical studies was commissioned 
recently by the World Bank. A global economy wide numerical simulation model was 
used to generate the changes in product and factor prices expected from the 
commitments to reform that China made in its accession negotiations. These were 
then mapped to the earning and spending patterns of various household types and 
regions in China as revealed in China’s rural and urban household surveys.  
The conventional wisdom that China’s WTO accession will impoverish its 
rural people, via greater import competition in its agricultural markets, need not 
prevail. One needs to keep in mind that, even if prices of some (land-intensive) farm 
products fall, those for other (labour-intensive) farm products could rise. Also, the 
removal of restrictions on China’s exports of textiles and clothing will boost town and 
village enterprises, so demand for non-farm workers in rural areas may grow even if 
demand for farm labour in aggregate falls.  
New estimates of the likely changes in agricultural prices as a result of WTO 
accession are drawn on to examine the factor reward implication of China’s WTO 
accession empirically using the GTAP model. Results reported in Anderson, 
Ianchovichina and Huang (2002) suggest farm-nonfarm and Western-Eastern income 
inequality may well rise but rural-urban income inequality need not. That conclusion 
is supported by a more-detailed study of households by Chen and Ravallion (2002). 
They find negligible impacts on inequality and a small reduction in poverty in 
aggregate, but some variance across households and regions. Farm households tend to 
lose, especially those highly dependent on feed grain production (in Northeastern 
China) and in hinterland regions with weak links to the booming non-farm sectors and 
eastern provinces. But the losses are at most very small, amounting to less than 5 per 
cent of household income. Facilitating the transfer of some labour from less-lucrative 
farm activities to now-more-lucrative non-farm work could (with the usual 
remittances back to the farm household) be sufficient to ensure all gain from China’s 
WTO accession.  
The study by Anderson, Ianchovichina and Huang (2002) also examines how 
much difference it could make if the hukou system that restricts rural-to-urban 
migration were to be abolished. Their results suggest that the sign of the effects could  14
be switched to favour the poorer farm households – albeit at the expense of the richer 
non-farm ones – if the remaining WTO accession-related reforms were to be 
accompanied by reform of the hukou system that allowed some members of those 
households to obtain higher-paying non-farm employment and repatriate earnings 
back to their farm family. And of course aggregate national economic welfare would 
be enhanced by that labour market reform as well. This illustrates the general point 
that gains from trade reform will be greater, the more liberal are domestic product and 
factor markets. 
A summary of those modelling results can be seen in Table 4. Without labour 
market reform, WTO accession for China would slightly reduce rewards to unskilled 
farm labour and to agricultural land while raising rewards to all other factors of 
production. That suggests farm households earning less than 60% of their income 
from unskilled nonfarm work could be harmed (albeit only slightly) from WTO 
accession. If complete abolition of restrictions to off-farm migration accompanied 
WTO accession reforms, however, the final column of Table 4 suggests all types of 
farm households could be better off as more family members are attracted to higher-
paying off-farm work.  
  In so far as China’s WTO accession puts upward pressure on international 
farm product prices, that would have the same pro-poor consequences in other 
developing countries as the multilateral farm trade reform discussed above. However, 
the extent of that price rise and the associated increase in China’s imports of farm 
products is going to be minor, and certainly will not, as implied by the title of Lester 
Brown’s 1995 book, ‘starve the world’ (see the empirical results in Anderson et al. 
1997). 
 
The risk of re-instrumentation of agricultural protection 
 
  If reducing agricultural protection/increasing market access in OECD 
countries is able to contribute to poverty alleviation in developing countries, then that 
objective will be compromised by efforts to substitute new forms of protection as 
traditional protective instruments are phased out. The imposition of tariff rate quotas 
accompanied by very high out-of-quota tariffs, and the administration of quotas so as 
to ensure less than full usage of them, are two ways in which agricultural protection 
changes following the Uruguay Round were minimized. As a result, many developing  15
countries are struggling to identify any significant growth in agricultural export 
resulting from the UR Agreement on Agriculture (Mathews 2002). 
There are at least two ways in which cuts may be minimized following the 
Doha Round too. One is via an expansion of exempt support measures to satisfy so-
called non-trade concerns related to the alleged ‘multifunctionality’ of agriculture – 
even though those concerns can readily be met much more directly and hence in less 
trade-distorting ways than is being proposed (Anderson 2000). While the proposal 
originated in the richest, most-protective economies, it is now being embraced by 
farmer groups in numerous developing countries as well. More than twenty such 
countries’ farm groups plus the EU met in Geneva 23-25 October 2002 and signed a 
declaration calling on WTO members to acknowledge that “agriculture cannot be 
treated in the same way as industrial sectors” because farming “fulfils a multitude of 
functions …”  
The other is via the adoption of stricter standards that then act as technical 
barriers to trade. Quarantine measures are an obvious case in point. They often add 
relatively large cost burdens to exporters from poorer countries because those 
countries do not have the same capability as developed countries to meet high 
standards (Wilson 2002b). Numerous developing countries have cited examples of 
SPS measures of OECD countries that are already significantly hindering their 
exports (Mathews 2002). Another is the increasing use of geographical indications 
and traditional expressions aimed at differentiating rich-country products, which 
effectively reduces the demand for substitute products from other countries. A less-
obvious possibility is the restriction of imports of food products containing 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The direct effects of a ban on GMOs could 
help exports from developing countries that choose not to adopt GMOs even though it 
harms those who have already adopted GMOs (Nielsen and Anderson 2001; 
Anderson and Yao 2002b). But the indirect, longer-term, and potentially much larger 
effects are adverse for the world’s poor, namely, the disincentive effect of such 
restrictions on investment in agricultural biotechnologies that could lower food prices 
and/or raise the nutritional attributes of foods available in developing countries. 
 
Conclusions and policy implications 
 
Low-income countries have much to gain from the WTO’s Doha Round of 
trade negotiations. In particular, they have a strong vested interest in working together  16
to push simultaneously for the freeing up of trade in both farm and textile products.
5 
Achieving that end will require some opening up of developing economies themselves 
as a quid pro quo, but that will benefit rather than hurt the poor in their own 
economies -- especially if it includes reducing the relatively high levels of protection 
currently afforded many capital-intensive manufacturing industries and the service 
sector. And it will be politically easier to do in agriculture the more developed 
countries reform their farm policies and thereby raise the mean and reduce the 
variance of international food prices. 
Nonetheless, in some developing countries at least, preparedness to move 
further down the reform path would be greater if mechanisms were introduced that 
increased perceived food security. How a country attains its optimal level of food 
security is a moot point. If a society would feel too food-insecure under laissez faire, 
bearing in mind the above considerations, then what needs to be determined is a sense 
of (a) its willingness to pay for more security by various means, and (b) the costs of 
those insurance measures. One such measure involves encouraging the holding of 
food stocks above those that would be commercially viable -- a public good that is 
explicitly allowed for in Annex 2 of the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture. The 
optimal level of encouragement is that which boosts stocks so that the marginal social 
benefit in terms of food security equals the marginal social cost of that intervention. 
Costs are non-trivial, however. Storage and interest costs and the costs of spoilage and 
quality deterioration can amount to more than 20 per cent a year. The cost part of the 
calculation also would need to include the risk of government failure if stocks were to 
be managed by an inefficient (or corrupt) public agency.  
If greater domestic production capability was considered by society to be one 
of the desirable means of boosting food security (because of a perception that food 
import dependence is too unreliable), there are far less costly ways of achieving that 
than via farm product price supports and import protection. For example, boosting 
production alone, rather than also taxing consumption as with an import barrier, 
would be a lower-cost and less-trade-distortive means of achieving that end. Even 
more effective could be improvements in land tenure and more investment in the 
stocks of primary factors used in food production: agricultural research,
6 rural human 
capital, and rural infrastructure (Otsuka 2002). That would provide an especially high 
                                                 
5 Within agriculture, developing countries’ interests in Doha agenda items align closely with those of 
the Cairns Group of non-subsidizing agricultural-exporting countries (Bjornskov and Lind 2002). See 
Cairns Group (2002) for its proposal on market access in the Doha Round. 
6 For recent reviews of the substantial contribution that a further boost to agricultural research could do 
for poverty alleviation in low-income countries, see Hazell and Haddad (2001) and Ryan (2002).  17
payoff in situations where, as in so many countries, there has been gross under-
investment in these activities in the past. Simultaneously, production could be boosted 
in many low-income countries simply by better clarifying and enforcing land rights, 
since they are a key source of collateral for securing loans for productive investments 
by farm households. 
Where targeted programs to boost the earning capacity of the poverty-stricken 
(e.g. via basic education/training) are still not enough to boost their food security in 
the short term, targeted consumer subsidies to provide that core group with food 
staples are much less costly than general subsidies to all food consumers via price-
depressing agricultural policies. Food aid that is targeted to just that group could be 
readily provided by the international community without depressing very much the 
prices received by farmers in recipient countries.
7 And greater technical and economic 
cooperation in the areas of agricultural research, rural education and health, and rural 
infrastructure may be important co-requisites of trade policy reform if developing 
countries are to be convinced that they would gain unequivocally from the Doha 
round. 
 
                                                 
7 If such subsidies are only paid in the towns and cities, however, this increases the risk of excessive, 
socially costly Harris-Todaro migration out of agriculture.  18
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WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, Geneva: World Trade Organization, 14 November. Table 1: Average tariff equivalents of import market access barriers to goods 








  High Income  Low Income  World 
Agriculture      
   High Income  16 22  18 
 Low Income  15 18  16 
 World  16 20  17 
Manufactures      
 High Income  1 11  4 
 Low Income  3 13  7 
 World  2 12  5 
Minerals/energy      
 High Income  0.1 1.3  0.4 
 Low Income  0.4 5.2  2.4 




Source: Hertel et al. (1999).  3
Table 2: Sectoral and regional contributions to economic welfare gains
a from 
completely removing trade barriers globally, post-Uruguay Round, 2005 
 
(a) in 1995 US$ billions 
 







and Food Primary Clothing Manufactures 
High Income   
   High Income  110.5 -0.0 -5.7 -8.1 96.6
 Low Income  11.6 0.1 9.0 22.3 43.1
 Total  122.1 0.0 3.3 14.2 139.7
Low Income   
 High Income  11.2 0.2 10.5 27.7 49.6
 Low Income  31.4 2.5 3.6 27.6 65.1
 Total  42.6 2.7 14.1 55.3 114.7
All Countries   
 High Income  121.7 0.1 4.8 19.6 146.2
 Low Income  43.0 2.7 12.6 49.9 108.1
 Total  164.7 2.8 17.4 69.5 254.3
 
(b) in per cent of total global gains 
 
Liberalizing   Agriculture Other Textiles & Other  Total
Region:  Benefitting 
region 
and Food Primary Clothing Manufactures 
High Income   
   High Income  43.4 0.0 -2.3 -3.2 38.0
 Low Income  4.6 0.1 3.5 8.8 16.9
 Total  48.0 0.0 1.3 5.6 54.9
Low Income   
 High Income  4.4 0.1 4.1 10.9 19.5
 Low Income  12.3 1.0 1.4 10.9 25.6
 Total  16.7 1.1 5.5 21.7 45.1
All Countries   
 High Income  47.9 0.1 1.9 7.7 57.5
 Low Income  16.9 1.0 4.9 19.6 42.5
 Total  64.8 1.1 6.8 27.3 100.0
 
a No account is taken in these calculations of the welfare effects of environmental changes 
associated with trade liberalization, which could be positive or negative depending in part on 
how environmental policies are adjusted following trade reforms.  
 
b High and low income here are short-hand for developed and developing countries. 
 
Source: Anderson (2003).  4
Table 3: Decomposition of economic welfare gains
a for various regions from 
the complete removal of trade barriers globally, post-Uruguay Round, 
2005 
 
(in 1995 US$ billions) 
 














NEAsia 86,635 11,497 95,172
SEAsia 18,710 -7,233 10,934
China 18,619 -9,913 9,053
India 12,596 -4,808 7,414
OtherSAsia 10,452 -3,128 6,245
Australia/NZ 1,016 5,852 6,702
NthAmerica 8,028 13,150 20,476
Mexico 2,240 -1,927 867
SouthernCone 15,767 -3,111 11,816
OtherLatinAm 2,009 3,690 5,562
Weurope 55,712 -6,401 50,130
EEFSU 2,935 5,985 8,860
MidEastNAfr 9,642 -3,426 5,565
SthAfrica 3,515 1,196 4,589
OthSubSahara 1,198 -715 520




Source: Anderson and Yao (2002a).  5
Table 4: Changes in China’s real factor prices and national economic welfare due to 
its WTO accession, 2001 to 2007 
 




Factor rewards:   
Alternative scenario: core 
case plus also removing 
labour market distortion 
 
Farm unskilled wages  -0.7  16.8 
Rental price of land  -5.5  -9.7 
Nonfarm unskilled wages  1.2  -3.8 
Skilled labor wages  0.8  -1.7 
Rental price of capital  1.3  -1.4 
 
Farm household income
a:    
Farm household type-A  -1.6  6.8 
Farm household type-B  -0.8  3.6 
Farm household type-C  0.1  0.4 
 
a Farm income from agriculture is made up of 57% from unskilled farm labour, 26% 
from agricultural land and 17% from farm capital, according to the GTAP database. 
In 1999 on average 51% of rural household income in China was earned outside 
agriculture, mostly from unskilled labour. Therefore, to illustrate the importance of 
those off-farm earnings for farm families, three types of farm households are shown in 
this table: it is assumed nonfarm unskilled labour contributes 0% of total farm 
household income for type A, 30% for type B, and 60% for type C.  
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